National Nurses United

10 J A N U A R Y / F E B R U A R Y 2 0 0 6 C A L I F O R N I A N U R S E C NA saw this mass confusion up close. A couple days after the storm hit on Aug. 30, we started receiving phone calls from RN members wanting to volunteer. I was assigned the task of researching where and how to place CNA volunteers so that they'd be put to best and highest use, but also working in a safe and organized envi- ronment. We decided to first try connecting directly with feder- al, state, and county health agencies to see what emergency programs were running. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was my first stop. There weren't many phone numbers listed on its website, and when I called the ones that were (mainly for the public affairs de- partments), I was rerouted time and time again to FEMA's 1-800 hotline number. I knew that number would be useless; it was de- signed to field calls from members of the general public, people like my Mom who were watching the devastating TV footage and felt compelled to help in some way, but didn't have specialized skills. As a union and association of highly-experienced and skilled RNs, we were looking to work on an organizational level. Nevertheless, I decided to give the 1-800 number a shot. I in- stantly regretted it. After redialing about 15 times just to get through, I waited another 15 minutes just to get someone on the line. "Tomas" finally answered and, while very friendly, was not helpful. He directed me to another website called citizencorps.gov (he pronounced it citizen "corpse"). When I tried to explain that CNA was an organization that could provide hundreds of RN vol- unteers and implored him to connect me with a department or higher-level official who wielded some decision-making power, he said he would pass on the message. I was not so sure he would. Tomas was very chatty, and started talking about how FEMA was doing the best it could, how the states are in charge and FEMA is only there to refer and coordinate people, and about how ridiculous it was that New Orleanians were shooting at rescuers. He babbled on for some time before I could stop him. I distinct- ly remember trying to get off the phone while Tomas talked non- stop, and thinking how absurd it was that I was trying to hang up on FEMA, but FEMA wouldn't let me. After searching around some more on the Internet, I found the website for a federal agency called the National Disaster Med- ical System. According to the description, NDMS sounded like the perfect place that would know where and how to deploy RN volunteers. A section of the operation branch of FEMA's response division under the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, NDMS was responsible for management and coordination of the feder- al government's medical response to major emergencies and dis- asters. Again, I had difficulty tracking down contact numbers. I did find a few for the regional offices in Texas and Mississippi, but was only able to leave voicemail. At one number, I wasn't even allowed to leave a message. I didn't know it at the time, but no- body from NDMS would ever call me back. In December, a special Democratic committee of the U.S. House of Representatives issued a scathing report that conclud- ed that "a combination of poor management, bureaucratic reshuffling, and inadequate funding have crippled the capacity of NDMS to provide an effective medical response to disasters." Officials were aware since 2002 that the agency had been dete- riorating, and transferring the agency from Health and Human Services to Homeland Security in 2003 just exacerbated its prob- lems, which ranged from inadequate planning and logistical sup- port, to inadequate supplies, to inadequate communications systems. During the Katrina response, NDMS teams were so ill prepared that they did not even have enough satellite phones to talk to each other. Until the U.S. Forest Service gave them in- teroperable radios, teams could not even reach their own mem- bers, other agencies, and on-site security personnel, the report stated. I didn't know all this at the time. All I knew was I couldn't get anyone on the phone. Disappointed, I gave up on the federal gov- ernment and turned to the states. I put in dozens of calls to various divisions of the Louisiana, Texas, and Mississippi departments of health services. The first problem I encountered was spotty phone service. When I dialed, Feature Story "People were just stumbling through. There was no identified coordinating body. The government has to assign responsibility for decisions to be made. But that didn't happen, and during a disaster is not the time to talk about it."

• Cover